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ABSTRACT
In his famous book Seeing Dark Things: The Philosophy of Shadows (2008), Roy Sorensen 
put forward a ‘blocking theory of shadows’, a causal view on these entities according to 
which a shadow is an absence of light caused by blockage. This approach allows him to 
solve a quite famous riddle on shadows, ‘the Yale puzzle’, that was devised by Robert Fo-
gelin in the late 1960s and that Sorensen presents in the form mentioned by Bas van Fraas-
sen (1989). István Aranyosi has recently criticized Sorensen’s solution to the Yale puzzle, 
on the grounds that it does not resist another version of the riddle, that Aranyosi calls ‘the 
Bilkent puzzle’. A new perspective on shadows, the ‘Material Exstitution View’, that alleged-
ly permits to solve both puzzles, could be adopted as an alternative. In this paper I will show 
that Sorensen’s blockage theory can actually handle both the Yale and the Bilkent puzzle, 
plus another one that I put forward (‘the donut puzzle’), which instead is fatal to Aranyosi’s 
position. As Sorensen puts it, nothing aside from the original blockage of light is needed.
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In this paper I will present István Aranyosi’s criticism of Roy Sorensen’s solution to the ‘Yale 
puzzle’ about shadows. According to Aranyosi, Sorensen’s approach does not work in a new ver-
sion of the riddle, the ‘Bilkent puzzle’, which means that it is not a proper per ective on shadows. 
A new approach seems necessary and Aranyosi put forward an alternative one, that allegedly 
solves both puzzles. In the first two sections I present the two authors’ views on shadows and 
their solution to the Yale puzzle, along with Aranyosi’s critique of Sorensen and his solution to the 
Bilkent riddle. In the third section I put forward a new riddle, ‘the donut puzzle’, and show that 
it is fatal to Aranyosi’s position. In the last section I finally show that Sorensen’s blockage theory 
can easily solve the donut puzzle and can actually handle both the Yale and the Bilkent puzzles, 
contrary to what Aranyosi maintains. The latter’s view on shadows, instead, should be rejected.
The Yale puzzle, the Bilkent puzzle and Sorensen’s 
‘blockage theory’
In his “The Nature of Shadows, from Yale to Bilkent” (2010), Aranyosi discusses Sorensen’s 
solution to the so-called ‘Yale shadow puzzle’, that Sorensen exposed in his famous book Seeing 
Dark Things: The Philosophy of Shadows (2008). The puzzle is presented in the form mentioned by 
Bas van Fraassen in Laws and Symmetry (1989):
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Although ‘shadow’ is often used as a count 
noun, it should be read below as a mass 
noun (as in ‘How much shadow is there in 
the photograph?’):
1. If X casts any shadow, then some light is 
falling directly on X.
2. X cannot cast shadow through an opaque 
object.
3. All shadow is shadow of something […].
Imagine a barn casting shadow on a sunny 
day. A bird flies between the barn and the 
shadow cast on the ground. The shadow di-
rectly beneath the bird cannot be cast by 
the bird (by virtue of I). Nor can it be cast by 
the barn (by virtue of II). But no third thing 
can cast the shadow. Hence, III is violated.
According to Sorensen, “the shadow appears on the far 
side by default. Nothing aside from the original blockage of 
light is needed to place shadow there” (Sorensen, 2008, p. 53). 
Therefore it is ‘the barn’s shadow’, and the flight of the bird has 
no influence at all in the situation. 
This solution, explains Aranyosi, is in line with So-
rensen’s general commitment throughout his book to re-
jecting the counterfactual theory of causation advanced by 
David Lewis. In the Yale puzzle, “the actual physical process 
that is responsible for darkness to be present on the far side 
of the wall is the light-blocking process due to the intera ion 
between light and the wall” (Aranyosi, 2010, p. 220). What 
counts in the barn case – and in causation in general – is not 
what would be the case but the actual physical process – ac-
cording to Sorensen, at least.
Despite agreeing that ‘barn’ is the right solution to ‘the 
Yale puzzle,’ Aranyosi is not happy with Sorensen’s ‘blockage 
theory’ – which means that Sorensen’s theory is the right 
solution, but for the wrong reason. Swapping the position of 
the bird and the wall, in fact, explains Aranyosi, Sorensen’s 
solution fails.
Imagine a bird flying between the Sun and a high wall 
(Sorensen’s barn, if you like), so that the poultry casts a shad-
ow on the latter. Call S* the dark patch on the ground, aligned 
with the Sun, the bird and the shadow cast on the wall. Is S* a 
part of the shadow of the wall or is it the shadow of the bird?
The new puzzle is damaging to Sorensen’s 
solution to the Yale puzzle. If Sorensen’s 
blockage theory were right, we would have 
to say that since it is the bird that blocks the 
relevant quantity of light, S* is the shadow of 
the bird. But this can’t be the case because in 
the new puzzle S* would really count as being 
cast through the wall – the bird’s shadow is 
actually cast on the wall; it ‘stops there’ as it 
were! (Aranyosi, 2010, p. 221).
If it is true that, if Sorensen were right, we would have to 
say that S* is the shadow of the bird, then we would also have 
to admit that in ‘the Bilkent shadow puzzle’ (which is how 
Aranyosi calls the new version of ‘the Yale puzzle’) the bird 
‘casts two shadows’, one on the wall and one on the ground 
(the two of them aligned with the bird and the Sun), which 
might seem strange – at least if we consider a single light 
source, as in this case. Worse, as Aranyosi points out, S* could 
not definitely be cast by (part of) the wall: “given the actual 
physical process view of causation that Sorensen champions, 
since the relevant part of the wall is already shaded by the 
bird, [...] it can’t be part of the light-blocking physical process” 
(Aranyosi, 2010, p. 221). Borrowing Sorensen’s words, one 
might say that the shadow directly beneath the wall cannot 
be cast by the wall (by virtue of I). Nor can it be cast by the 
bird, however (by virtue of II). “But no third thing can cast 
the shadow. Hence, III is violated” (Sorensen, 2008, p. 53).2
This should be enough to refute Sorensen’s ‘blockage 
theory’, but Aranyosi adds another unwanted consequence of 
it, that allows him to call the new riddle ‘the Bilkent shadow 
puzzle’: again, given Sorensen’s view of causation, “we should 
say that the reason it is dark at 1 a.m. in Yale (New Haven, 
US), when there is a huge cloud over Bilkent (Ankara, Tur-
key) at 7 a.m., is that Yale is in the shadow of that cloud” (Ara-
nyosi, 2010, p. 221), which seems clearly wrong.
Aranyosi’s ‘Material Exstitution 
View’ on shadows
As an alternative to Sorensen’s approach, Aranyosi 
defends the Material Exstitution View (MEV), according to 
which shadows are not ‘immaterially constituted’ by parts of 
the regions they cover. Rather, they are “spatially determined 
[...] by the configuration of light that delimits the region occu-
pied by them” (Aranyosi, 2010, p. 222). Accordingly, “proper 
parts of shadows are not themselves shadows” (2010, p. 223). 
Therefore, neither S* counts as shadow nor does S, the dark 
patch on the ground aligned with the bird and the Sun in the 
original Yale puzzle. Hence, they cannot violate (1)-(3) and 
we can keep viewing these principles as plausible ones.
More importantly, MEV (dis)solves ‘the Yale puzzle’: 
both in the case of the bird flying between the barn and the 
ground and in the case of it flying between the barn and the 
Sun, the cast shadow is the barn’s shadow. In both cases, in 
fact, the dark region on the ground is the same and the light 
that delimits and determines it is the one passing around the 
barn – i.e. the light that is not blocked by it. According to this 
view (that might even be called ‘non-blockage theory’), it is 
the barn that casts the shadow on the ground, irre ective of 
the bird flying behind or in front of it. The riddle related to 
‘the Bilkent puzzle’ is of course solved too: it is not the pres-
2 Which shows that ‘the Bilkent shadow puzzle’ is actually no different from the original ‘Yale puzzle’. It will be shown, in fact, that the 
solution is the same.
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ence of a cloud over Ankara the reason why it is dark in Yale 
at 1 a.m. It is because at 1 a.m. Yale is standing within the 
shadow of the Earth, as we learn at school.
Right, but what is a shadow anyway?
Sorensen considers it a three-dimensional volume: “the 
shadow is three-dimensional, for the back side of the object 
is not receiving light” (2008, p. 143). According to the author 
of Seeing Dark Things, we should not focus on the cast shadow, 
which is just an extremity of the three-dimensional one: 
The essential connection between a shad-
ow and its blocker is obscured by our ten-
dency to focus on the cast shadow (the part 
of the three-dimensional shadow that is 
intercepted by a surface). [...] As dusty air 
reveals, the cast shadow is just an edge of 
a three-dimensional shadow that adheres to 
its blocker (Sorensen, 2008, p. 92).
If shadows are three-dimensional volumes, however, 
how could they be “spatially determined [...] by the config-
uration of light that delimits the region occupied by them” 
(Aranyosi, 2010, p. 222)? In order for this to happen, light 
should completely surround a lightless non-opaque portion 
of space – with the exception of its leading edge, i.e., the part 
that is attached to the obtruder. But of course this can only 
happen with small objects, thanks to the phenomenon of light 
diffra ion (see Figure 1).
In ordinary cases, instead, the situation is the one de-
scribed in Figure 2.
As the Figure 2 shows, the ‘shadow cone’ is actually trun-
cated. Its lateral surface is surrounded by light. But light does 
not – and cannot – surround the whole dark volume. When 
we consider shadows as three-dimensional entities, MEV is 
not an applicable principle. Accordingly, Aranyosi’s solution 
to the Yale/Bilkent puzzle cannot work either.
Since van Fraassen presented it as a puzzle about cast 
shadows, however, then perhaps it is not appropriate to con-
sider three-dimensional portions of space (volumes), but 
rather two-dimensional ones (surfaces). As a matter of fact, 
Figure 1. Wave diffraction.
Source: Karagioza (2016).
Figure 2. Formation of shadows.
Source: Science Class (n.d.).
a cast shadow is “the part of the three-dimensional shadow 
that is intercepted by a surface” (Sorensen, 2008, p. 92) and 
in talks about the Immaterial Constitution View (ICV) or 
the Material Exstitution View (MEV) “the notion of shadow 
that is relevant [...] is that of a shadow cast on a surface, i.e. a 
two-dimensional” (Aranyosi, 2007, p. 416).
In this case MEV works and Aranyosi invokes it for a 
solution to the Yale puzzle alternative to Sorensen’s. As we 
have seen, according to the author of “The Nature of Shad-
ows, from Yale to Bilkent”, relying on MEV rather than on the 
‘blockage theory’ can provide the same (reasonable) solution 
even in a new version of the puzzle, that allegedly hinders the 
light-blocking-process account of shadows. Other situations, 
however, suggest that MEV might not be such a reliable prin-
ciple, when it gets to cast shadows.
The donut puzzle
Consider the state of affairs shown in Figure 3.
Imagine a big opaque ring (a big donut, if you like) stand-
ing between an opaque disk and a light source. As the picture 
shows, were the ring not present, the cast shadow would oc-
cupy a smaller area of the screen. Were the disk not present, 
instead, the cast shadow would have the shape of a ring. It ap-
pears as a dark disk, though. Common sense tells us that the 
central area of the cast shadow on the screen is the shadow of 
the disk, while the rest is the shadow of the ring. According 
to Aranyosi, however, the dark patch on the screen, aligned 
with the light source, the hole in the donut and the illumi-
nated part of the disk – that one would probably consider as 
a proper part of the cast shadow (let us call it S**) – does not 
count as a shadow. As we have seen before, in fact, Aranyosi 
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maintains that “proper parts of shadows are not themselves 
shadows” (2010, p. 223). This means that the dark disk on the 
screen is but one single (cast) shadow, as we also learn from 
Aranyosi’s account of the Yale/Bilkent puzzle: “If we adopt 
the material exstitution view, then neither S, nor S* count as 
shadows. The only shadow in the Yale puzzle is the one that 
is surrounded by the light that has not been blocked by the 
wall” (2010, p. 222).3
In the situation depicted in the above picture, the config-
uration of light that delimits (surrounds) the region occupied 
by the shadow cast on the screen is clearly the one that has 
not been blocked by the ring. The opaque disk has nothing 
to do with that. According to MEV, then, it seems we should 
conclude that it is (only) the ring that casts the shadow on the 
screen. But of course this cannot be the case – or else the re-
sult should be the same cast shadow that one would see were 
the opaque disk not present.
An advocate of MEV might reply that even admitting 
that what seems to be a single dark disk on the screen is ac-
tually the result of two shadows that fit together (the ring’s 
and the opaque disk’s), this would not undermine Aranyo-
si’s solution to the Bilkent puzzle, for in the latter case the 
bird’s shadow is ‘blocked’ by the wall, while in the state of 
affairs depicted above the opaque disk can cast a shadow 
directly on the screen. In other words, the situation is not 
the same.
Figure 3. The donut puzzle.
3 As said before, S* is the dark patch on the ground, aligned with the Sun, the bird and the shadow cast on the wall in the new version of 
the Yale puzzle (due to Aranyosi), in which the bird is flying between the Sun and the barn. S, instead, is the dark patch on the ground, 
aligned with the Sun and the bird in the original version of the Yale puzzle, in which the bird is flying behind the barn and does not 
receive any light from the Sun.
4 It might be objected that this is exactly part of Aranyosi’s criticism of Sorensen’s ‘blockage theory’, therefore it is not correct to attri-
bute a similar view to him. However, Aranyosi does not deny that shadows are the result of an interaction between a light source and 
an obtruder, of course: “[shadows] are ontologically dependent entities. What they depend upon is what we shall call their source. The 
source of a shadow is the quantity of light and the object, the obtruder, which stands in its way toward the surface where the shadow 
is located. There is also a condition on the environment that has to be satisfied, which is a nonzero volume of space, for which it is true 
that light would have penetrated it, had it not been blocked by the obtruder. The relation between a shadow and its source is causal, 
the latter causing the former” (2007, p. 417). There cannot be a shadow without a light source and an obtruder, whichever view on these 
entities one might advocate.
Of course it is not open to an advocate of MEV to ad-
mit that there are two shadows on the screen, because light 
surrounds and delimits just one. Otherwise, MEV should be 
amended to the effect that some shadows can be delimited 
by other shadows and not just by light. Perhaps this could be 
done on the condition that ‘shadow’ is then used as a count 
noun and not, as sugge ed by van Fraassen, as a mass noun 
– which is probably not in the spirit of MEV. Note that this 
would not necessarily imply admitting that shadows do have 
parts, since S* – the dark patch on the ground, aligned with 
the Sun, the bird and the shadow cast on the wall in the new 
version of the Yale puzzle – could be seen as an independent 
shadow and not as a proper part of the shadow on the ground 
– which again is possible only on the condition that ‘shadow’ 
is considered a count noun.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, let us assume that an 
advocate of MEV can admit that shadows do have parts – 
or that two distinct shadows can fit together, one ‘inside’ the 
other. Whose shadow is S* then, in the Bilkent puzzle? It can-
not be a proper part of the shadow cast by the wall, “since 
the relevant part of the wall is already shaded by the bird” 
(Aranyosi, 2010, p. 221).4 But if S* is not cast by the wall, then 
the only other plausible alternative is that the caster is the 
bird. What if S* is considered an independent shadow and 
not a proper part of the shadow on the ground then? Well, 
this would clearly be tantamount to admitting that it is cast 
by the bird. 
Either admitting that shadows do have parts or that two 
distinct shadows can fit together, one ‘inside’ the other, then, 
this would be damaging to Aranyosi, for in any case he would 
be forced to conclude that it is the bird that casts shadow S* – 
which is exactly what he wants to deny.
The only way of concluding that S* is cast by the wall 
(insofar as it is appropriate to  eak in this way, since, accord-
ing to MEV, S* does not count as shadow) is by maintain-
ing that there is but one single shadow on the ground – in 
other words, that there is no such thing as shadow S*. This 
assumption allows Aranyosi to focus on the light surrounding 
the shadow on the ground and conclude that it is the con-
figuration of light that delimits the region occupied by the 
shadow what determines it (see Aranyosi, 2010, p. 222). The 
consequence is that in both versions of ‘the Yale puzzle’ he can 
conclude that the shadow on the ground is cast by the wall 
and the bird has no influence at all, wherever it decides to fly. 
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However, the same applies to what we may now call 
‘the donut puzzle’, depicted in the picture above. A sup-
porter of Aranyosi’s position would be forced to admit that 
in the ring case the shadow on the screen is but one, for 
the rationale is the same as in the Yale puzzle – irrespec-
tive of the differences between the two cases. But then, she 
would also be forced to admit that it is the ring that casts 
the shadow on the screen, while the opaque disk plays no 
role at all – which is clearly wrong.
Nor would an appeal to Lewis’s idea of causation as in-
fluence help Aranyosi’s cause.5 Quite the contrary, since this 
counterfactual theory seems to strengthen the view that in 
‘the donut puzzle’ the shadow is caused exclusively by the ring. 
Borrowing Aranyosi’s words, in fact, it might be said that it is 
the donut alone that exerts influence on the shadow in this 
puzzle. Small changes in the position or size of the donut will 
generate small changes in the configuration of light surround-
ing the shadow. Not so for the opaque disk: small changes in 
the position or size of the disk will have no influence whatso-
ever on the light-darkness configuration on the screen.
In conclusion, MEV can solve (or rather dissolve) ‘the 
Yale puzzle’ in its two versions, but clashes against ‘the donut 
puzzle’. Something is wrong with it, then – at least when it 
comes to solving shadow-related riddles. 
Conclusion: Defending 
Sorensen’s blockage theory
Intuition tells us that it is the wall that casts the shadow on 
the ground in both the Yale and the Bilkent puzzles. According 
to Aranyosi, Sorensen’s blockage theory could explain why this is 
the case in the first riddle, but fails to do it in the second one; in 
the Bilkent puzzle, instead, an advocate of the blockage theory 
is forced to admit that S*, the dark patch on the ground aligned 
with the Sun and the bird, is cast by the latter. 
Since this is a result contrary to common sense, that 
even Sorensen would probably disapprove, Aranyosi con-
cludes that the blockage theory should be rejected and puts 
forward an alternative approach to shadows, which he calls 
Material Exstitution View (MEV). MEV gives an apparently 
plausible explanation of why the shadow on the ground is cast 
by the wall in both puzzles, but leads to a paradoxical conclu-
sion in another riddle, ‘the donut puzzle’, that I have proposed 
in this paper. This being so, MEV appears to be a mere ad 
hoc solution for the Yale puzzle in its two versions and not an 
account of shadows that can work in general.
In the donut puzzle, Sorensen’s blockage theory leads 
to a very natural conclusion, instead: the central part of 
the dark patch on the screen (S**) is the shadow cast by 
the illuminated portion of the opaque disk, while the rest 
is shadow cast by the ring. Now, considering that it scores 
so well in the original Yale puzzle too, why not pondering 
a bit more on the Bilkent version of the riddle, in order to 
see whether we can reconsider Aranyosi’s conclusion that 
Sorensen’s approach is wrong?
If, from our star’s viewpoint, a bird flies behind a barn 
in a sunny day, the blockage theory gives a clear and simple 
explanation of why the whole dark patch on the ground is 
the barn’s (cast) shadow: it is the granary that blocks the 
light rays, and the bird has nothing to do with that. But if 
the poultry decides to fly in front of the barn, it then inter-
cepts part of the light and casts a shadow on the wall. How 
could this portion of the wall cast a shadow on the ground, 
now that it does not intercept light anymore, asks Ara-
nyosi? It cannot. Therefore, if one sticks to the blockage 
theory, one must conclude that part of the dark patch is 
the bird’s shadow. Or reject Sorensen’s approach and adopt 
another view on shadows, which is what Aranyosi does.
Note, however, that when the bird flies in front of the 
barn, the dark patch on the ground is already there. The flight 
of the poultry does not change the situation, nor can any dif-
ference be perceived in the shadow on the ground. In fact, 
the presence of the latter is due to the presence of the barn. 
More importantly, it is the barn the responsible for the orig-
inal blockage of light. Again, “nothing aside from the original 
blockage of light is needed to place shadow there” (Sorensen, 
2008, p. 53). That is why the flight of a bird in front of the 
granary is irrelevant. An advocate of Sorensen’s approach can 
then maintain that the cast shadow is the barn’s shadow, even 
in Aranyosi’s new version of the puzzle. 
Moreover, since Sorensen defines himself as a ‘nonstick-
ler’, he would probably add that the bird’s blockage of light in 
the Bilkent puzzle is not of the sort that makes a difference 
to the scene; if the poultry were absent, the scene would look 
the same (see Sorensen, 2008, p. 64). Sorensen can very well 
conclude that the shadow on the ground is cast by the barn, 
then, even sticking to his blockage theory. The same rationale 
applies to the cloud over Bilkent, of course. The cloud has no 
influence whatsoever on the darkness in Yale at 1 a.m. As said 
before, the reason why it is dark at Yale at that time of the day 
is that the city is standing within the shadow of the Earth, be 
it cloudy in Turkey or not.
In sum, it seems that Sorensen’s blockage theory 
about shadows scores better than Aranyosi’s ‘Material Ex-
stitution View’ (MEV), even when we ignore that shad-
ows are actually three-dimensional portions of space and 
focus only on bi-dimensional cast ones. Three puzzles have 
been analyzed in this paper: the blockage theory can solve 
all of them, while MEV cannot. The new (banal) riddle 
put forward in section three is fatal to MEV, which should 
then be rejected, pace Aranyosi.
5 Aranyosi is an advocate of it, especially when it gets to shadows: “in other earlier work on shadows I argued for Lewis’s latest coun-
terfactual theory of causation – causation as influence – as relevant in shadow related puzzles. According to this theory, C causes E iff a 
series of changes in E counterfactually depend on a corresponding series of small alterations in C” (2010, p. 222).
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